Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.: A Threat to U.S. International Banking? by Flatt, Shawn E.
CASE COMMENT
CITIBANK, N.A. v. WELLS FARGO ASIA LTD.:
A THREAT TO U.S. INTERNATIONAL
BANKING?
I. INTRODUCTION
Each day more than $750 billion flows across United States borders
in the Eurodollar market.' United States banks participate in this market
with very little direct regulation, either on the state or federal level. As a
result, courts encounter difficulties in resolving disputes involving the
Eurodollar market.
Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 2 the first case to reach the
United States Supreme Court involving the Eurodollar market, illustrates
some of the significant problems that U.S. courts have faced. Wells Fargo
Asia Ltd. ("WFAL"), the Singapore branch of Wells Fargo, National As-
sociation ("Wells Fargo"), made two time deposits with Citibank/Manila,
the Philippine branch of Citibank, National Association ("Citibank").3
WFAL sued Citibank for Citibank/Manila's failure to repay these depos-
its. The agreement which created the time deposits was silent on the law
that governs it, where it could be enforced, and what risks the parties
assumed. WFAL claims that the action is for a simple breach of contract,
but Citibank insists that an adverse decision could destroy the U.S. bank-
ing system. Both parties base their arguments on two well-established
legal principles that appear to contradict each other. The only thing the
parties can agree on is the fact that they had reached an agreement.
This case comment briefly describes the Eurodollar market, examines
the history of this case, discusses the options which currently are before
1. Brief of the New York Clearing House Association and the Institute of International Bank-
ers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal ("Brief of the New York Clearing House") at 6, Citibank
NA v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd, - US -, 110 S Ct 2034 (1990). Foreign readers should find this case
comment to be of particular interest because the case highlights the current U.S. approach to foreign
branch banking and the Eurodollar market.
All monetary values are stated in United States dollars.
2. Citibank NA v Wells Fargo Asia Ltd, - US -, 110 S Ct 2034 (1990) ("Wells Fargo VI").
3. As of year-end 1989, Citibank was the largest bank in the United States with deposits of
$108 billion and total assets of $158 billion. Wells Fargo was the seventh largest U.S. bank with
deposits of $36 billion and total assets of $45 billion. Polk's Bank Directory vi (North American ed,
Spring 1990).
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the Court of Appeals and analyzes the role of the legal system in the
Eurodollar market. The comment concludes by addressing the ramifica-
tions of the decision on U.S. banking law.
II. THE EURODOLLAR MARKET
Eurocurrencies are deposits denominated in foreign currency located
in a bank outside the country where the currency is issued as legal
tender.4 Thus, a Eurodollar is a U.S. dollar denominated deposit located
outside of the United States in a bank which has a resulting obligation to
repay the deposit in U.S. dollars. 5
Eurocurrencies are traded through direct dealing and through bro-
kers via telephone or telex. 6 Prices are quoted with a bid/offer spread.7
The bid rate is the rate which will be paid on deposits and the offer rate is
the rate which will be charged on loans.8
In a typical -interbank Eurodollar transaction such as the one be-
tween WFAL and Citibank/Manila, the depositing bank (Bank A), lo-
cated either within or outside the United States, agrees to place a dollar
denominated deposit with a second bank (Bank B), which is located
outside of the United States. Bank B may be a foreign bank or an over-
seas branch of a United States bank. Bank A makes its deposit by using a
wire transfer to order its correspondent bank in New York (Bank Y) to
transfer funds from Bank A's dollar account to Bank B's correspondent
bank in New York (Bank Z). Bank Z then credits Bank B's dollar denomi-
nated account by the amount of the transfer. The transfer of funds be-
tween the correspondent banks, Y and Z, is accomplished by the use of a
wire transfer through a clearing mechanism in New York City known as
the Clearing House Interbank Payments System ("CHIPS").9 CHIPS
nets all debits and credits, and the balances are settled each day on the
books of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 10 Repayment is accom-
plished simply by reversing the entire process.11 The actual dollars re-
4. J. Orlin Grabbe, International Finania! Markets 14 (Elsevier, 1986).
5. Wells Fargo VI, - US at -, I10 S Ct at 2037. Eurodollar deposits may be held in banks
located throughout the world, not only in Europe. David Eiteman and Arthur Stonehill, Multina-
tional Business Finance 386 (Addison-Wesley, 4th ed 1986).
6. Grabbe, International Financial Markets at 245 (cited in note 4).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Wells Fargo VI, - US at -, 110 S Ct at 2037; Brief of the New York Clearing House at 4
(cited in note 1).
10. Brief of the New York Clearing House at 6 (cited in note 1). CHIPS currently clears roughly
146,000 transactions per day with aggregate payments averaging $750 billion daily. Roughly 90 per-
cent of all interbank Eurodollar transactions are cleared through CHIPS. Id.
11. Wells Fargo VI, - US at -, 10 S Ct at 2037.
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main in the United States in the correspondent banks despite the fact
that the ownership of the deposit has changed hands.
In June 1983, the month that WFAL and Citibank/Manila entered
into their transaction, the gross size of the Eurocurrency market was
roughly $2,056 billion in deposits.12 Eurodollar deposits made up ap-
proximately 80 percent of the market ($1,641 billion).13 Roughly 72 per-
cent of the Eurocurrency market ($1,483 billion) was composed of
interbank deposits. 14
Ill. WELLS FARGO ASIA LTD v. CITIBANK N.A.
A. The Transaction
On June 10, 1983, Citibank/Manila contacted Astley & Pearce, an
independent Asian money-broker, in order to borrow U.S. dollars.' 5 The
broker then contacted WFAL and the parties' traders made arrangements
for two deposits.' 6 Both of the deposits were $1 million time deposits
which were to be repaid on December 9 and 10, 1983, with 10 percent
interest rates. 17 The broker then sent a report to both of the parties and
a confirmation telex to WFAL.18 On June 14, 1983, WFAL confirmed
the deposits and instructed its correspondent bank, Wells Fargo, New
York, to pay the required funds to Citibank, New York, Citibank/Ma-
nila's correspondent bank.19 Computer-generated telexes from each
party accompanied the confirmations.20 The confirmations and com-
puter-generated telexes, along with a statement of Terms and Conditions
sent by Citibank/Manila to WFAL, comprise the entire written agree-
ment between the parties.2 '
On October 15, 1983, the Philippine government issued a Memoran-
dum to Authorized Agent Banks ("MAAB 47").22 The decree stated that
total foreign obligations to foreign financial institutions could not be re-
12. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, World Financial Markets 9 (January 1984).
13. Id.
14. Id; Grabbe, International Financial Markets at 386 (cited in note 4).
15. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd v Citibank, NA, 612 F Supp 351, 354 (DCNY 1985) ("Wells Fargo I);
Wells Fargo Asia Ltd v Citibank NA, 695 F Supp 1450, 1451 (SDNY 1988) ("Wells Fargo IV").
16. Wells Fargo IV, 695 F Supp at 1451.
17. Wells Fargo VI, - US at -, 110 S Ct at 2037. Neither of the parties presented evidence at
the trial as to what the traders said, or even as to whether they negotiated directly with each other or
through the broker. Wells Fargo IV, 695 F Supp at 1451.
18. Id at 1451-52.
19. Wells Fargo 1, 612 F Supp at 354.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id at 355.
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duced without the approval of the Philippine Central Bank. 23 Citibank/
Manila had $630 million in deposits in favor of fifty non-Philippine finan-
cial institutions that fell under the freeze. 24 Roughly half of the funds had
been used for loans to Philippine entities and the other half had been
redeposited in the Eurocurrency interbank market.2 5
B. The Path to the Supreme Court
After Citibank/Manila refused to repay the deposits upon maturity,
WFAL brought suit against Citibank, Citibank/Manila's parent, in the
district court of the Southern District of New York on February 10,
1984.26 Citibank quickly responded. On February 20, 1984, Citibank/
Manila sought permission from the Philippine Central Bank to repay
some of its deposits.27 In March 1984, the Philippine Central Bank gave
Citibank/Manila permission to repay its deposits with its non-Philippine
assets. 28 As a result, WFAL received a payment of $934,000.29 Citibank/
Manila continued to pay interest on the remaining sum.30 MAAB 47 did
not restrain the payment of interest.31
WFAL moved for summary judgment in December 1984.32 The dis-
trict court denied the motion on the grounds that there were two issues of
material fact. The first issue was the nature of sovereign risk in Eurodol-
lar transactions. 33 Sovereign risk "results from the acts of the foreign
government (e.g., confiscation) in whose jurisdiction the deposits are held
which prevent repayment by the foreign-based branch." 34 The second
issue involved the situs of the debt.3 5
At trial, Citibank argued that WFAL had accepted sovereign risk
and that the deposits were only payable in Manila and were governed by
Philippine law.36 WFAL contended that Citibank had agreed to be liable
23. Id, excerpt from Central Bank of the Philippines, Memorandum to Authorized Agent Banks
No 47 (October 15, 1983).
24. Peter Smedresman and Andreas Lowenfeld, Eurodollars; Multinational Banks, and National
Law; 64 NYU L Rev 733, 763 (1989).
25. Id.
26. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd v Citibank, NA, 852 F2d 657, 659 (2d Cir 1988) ("Wells Fargo V").
27. Wells Fargo 1, 612 F Supp at 355.
28. Id. Citibank/Manila's non-Philippine assets were carried on its Philippine books but depos-
ited in banks located outside of the Philippines or invested in non-Philippine enterprises. Wells Fargo
Asia Ltd v Citibank NA, 660 F Supp 946, 947-48 (SDNY) ("Wells Fargo II").
29. Wells Fargo 11, 660 F Supp at 948.
30. Wells Fargo 1, 612 F Supp at 355.
31. Smedresman and Lowenfeld, 64 NYU L Rev at 763 note 135 (cited in note 24).
32. Id at 766.
33. See Wells Fargo 1, 612 F Supp at 356-57.
34. Id at 353.
35. See id at 356-57.
36. Wells Fargo II, 660 F Supp at 947.
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for its Philippine obligations and that sovereign risk was irrelevant be-
cause MAAB 47 did not excuse the honoring of the deposits. 37
The trial court viewed WFAL's position as an invitation to decide
the action under Philippine law.38 The court based its decision in favor of
WFAL on two conclusions it reached about Philippine law. According to
the decision, Philippine law recognizes that bank branches are not sepa-
rate entities apart from the home office and that a branch obligation is an
obligation of the bank as a whole.39 The trial court also concluded that
MAAB 47 did not forbid repayment of the deposits with Citibank's
worldwide assets.4° Thus, Citibank could transfer funds from outside the
Philippines to Manila in order to repay the deposits.4 '
Citibank had three defenses which the trial court addressed. The
first defense, that customs and practices in international banking sup-
ported its interpretation of the agreement, was rejected on the grounds
that "no relevant custom or practice was established by either party." 42
Citibank had tried to prove that Federal Regulation D, which exempts a
foreign deposit that is payable only at a foreign branch from reserve re-
quirements, demonstrates an understanding that deposits can be repaid
only at the branch of a U.S. bank where they were made and are subject
to the laws of the host country.43 The trial court held that the argument
was moot since it accepted the position that the deposits were payable
only in Manila and were subject to Philippine law.44
In its second defense, Citibank claimed that it was protected from
liability by the act of state doctrine. 45 Under the act of state doctrine, if a
court finds that the adjudication of an action would hinder the executive
branch's conduct of foreign affairs, then it should refrain from question-
ing the validity of the foreign state's actions. 46 The trial court held that
the doctrine did not apply because Philippine law and policy were not
offended by requiring Citibank to repay the deposits. 47 The court also
rejected Citibank's final defense, impossibility of performance, on the
grounds that Citibank could use outside assets to repay the deposits. 48
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id at 948-49.
40. Id at 949-50.
41. Id at 950.
42. Id.
43. Id; 12 CFR S 204.1 et seq (1986).
44. Wells Fargo If, 660 F. Supp. at 950.
45. See id.
46. Id, citing Allied Bank International v Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F2d 516, 520-21
(2d Cir 1985).
47. Id at 950.
48. Id at 951.
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On appeal, Citibank attacked the trial court's decision on two fronts.
First, Citibank questioned the trial court's interpretation of Philippine
law because it was based on only two affidavits of Philippine lawyers total-
ling fewer than fourteen pages. 49 Second, Citibank argued that even if
the trial court's interpretation of Philippine law were correct, a U.S. court
should not enforce it because it would conflict with U.S. law and policy. 50
The Court of Appeals remanded the case and ordered the trial court to
make supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law.5 1
On remand, the district court held that repayment and collection
were two distinct concepts.52 Repayment, according to the opinion, "re-
fers to the location where the wire transfers effectuating repayment at
maturity were to occur." 53 Collection, on the other hand, "refers to the
place or places where plaintiff was entitled to look for satisfaction of its
deposits in the event that Citibank should fail to make the required wire
transfers at the place of repayment." 54
In addition, the district court held that the confirmation slips estab-
lished an agreement between the parties that repayment was to occur in
New York.55 However, the court did not find an agreement specifying
where the deposits could be collected in the deposit contract.56 It also
failed to find a provision in Philippine law which precluded or negated an
agreement calling for the collection of deposits outside of Manila.57
In addressing what law controls if there is no controlling Philippine
law, the district court redefined the issue. The real issue, according to the
district court, was "not so much about where repayment physically was to
be made or where the deposits were collectible, but rather which assets
Citibank [was] required to use in order to satisfy its obligations to the
49. Wells Fargo IV, 695 F Supp at 1451.
50. Smedresman and Lowenfeld, 64 NYU L Rev at 772 (cited in note 24).
51. Wells Fargo VI, - US at-, 110 S Ct at 2038; Wells Fargo Asia Ltd v Citibank, NA 847 F2d
837 (1988) ("Wells Fargo iI"). The Court of Appeals instructed the trial court to examine the follow-
ing four areas:
(a) Whether the parties agreed as to where the debt would be repaid, including
whether they agreed that the deposits were collectible only in Manila.
(b) If there was an agreement, what were its essential terms?
(c) Whether Philippine law (other than MAAB 47) precludes or negates an agreement
between the parties to have the deposits collectible outside of Manila.
(d) If there is no controlling Philippine law referred to in (c) above, what law does
control?
Wells Fargo Vi, - US at -, 110 S Ct at 2038.
52. Wells Fargo IV, 695 F Supp at 1451.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id at 1452.
56. Id at 1453.
57. Id.
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plaintiff."5 8 The court concluded that this issue imposed the duty of de-
termining whether Philippine or New York law controlled.59
The district court held that New York law was controlling under
both the New York and federal choice-6f-law rules.6° After reviewing
New York case law, the court held that under New York law a "parent
bank is ultimately liable for the obligations of the foreign branch." 6' As a
result, Citibank was held liable for Citibank/Manila's deposit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, but on
different grounds.62 The Second Circuit panel began its analysis by citing
a general banking principle that "a debt on deposit normally authorizes a
demand for the money only at the relevant branch." 63 It went on to note
that the rule could be altered by agreement of the parties. 64
The court then cited three Second Circuit cases for the following
rule: "If the parties agree that repayment of a deposit in a foreign bank or
branch may occur at another location, they authorize demand and collec-
tion at that other location." 65 Thus, "a debt may be collected wherever it
is repayable, unless the parties have agreed otherwise." 66 Since the dis-
trict court's finding that there was a repayment agreement was not clearly
erroneous, the Second Circuit panel affirmed the judgment. 67
C. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The Parties' Positions. Citibank's strategy had evolved by the
time the action reached the Supreme Court into a four-point argument
based entirely on federal law. Citibank first asserted that federal law re-
quired depositors in foreign branches of U.S. banks to assume sovereign
risk.68 Citibank based its position on the federal regulations which gov-
ern reserve requirements (Regulation D), Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration ("FDIC") insurance, and interest rates.69 Since deposits payable
outside of the United States are exempt from reserve requirements and
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id at 1454.
61. Id.
62. Wells Fargo VI, - US at -, 110 S Ct at 2039.
63. Wells Fargo V, 852 F2d at 660; Wells Fargo VI, - US at -, 110 S Ct at 2039.
64. Wells Fargo V, 852 F2d at 660; Wells Fargo VI, - US at-, 110 S Ct at 2039.
65. Wells Fargo V, 852 F2d at 660, citing Allied Bank International v Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir 1985); Garcia v Chase Manhattan Bank, NA, 735 F2d 645, 650-
51 (2d Cir 1984); Braka v Bancomer, SNC, 762 F2d 222, 225 (2d Cir 1985).
66. Id at 661.
67. Id.
68. Brief for Petitioner Citibank, NA ("Citibank Brief") at 14, Citibank NA v Wells Fargo Asia
Ltd., - US -, 110 S Ct 2034 (1990).
69. Citibank Brief (cited in note 68).
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protections, Citibank argued that foreign depositors assume "whatever
regulatory benefits and risks that the foreign regulatory regimes pro-
vided."70 Citibank emphasized one Federal Reserve regulation in particu-
lar.71 In 1970, the Federal Reserve ruled that if a U.S. bank guaranteed a
deposit which was payable only outside of the United States, the deposit
would be subject to the reserve requirements. 72 The regulation states in
part that a "customer who makes a deposit that is payable solely at a
foreign branch assumes whatever risk may exist that the foreign country
might impose restrictions on withdrawals." 73 Citibank made a similar ar-
gument using interest rate regulations. 74
After identifying the federal law concerning sovereign risk, Citibank
made its case for federal preemption or in the alternative, the creation of
federal common law. Citibank's basic argument for preemption was that
since the case arose "in the fields of foreign commerce and foreign rela-
tions where it is essential that the Nation 'speak with one voice,' a state or
foreign rule that places foreign sovereign risk on Citibank must yield to
the supremacy of federal law and policy."7 5 The argument for federal
common law was basically a reiteration of the federal preemption
points. 76
Citibank's third point attempted to show the deficiencies of state
and foreign law with respect to the liability of U.S. banks for foreign
branch deposits.77 Although it claimed that these laws were consistent
with its views on sovereign risk, Citibank argued that the application of
state and foreign laws to such transactions would have three fatal short-
comings. 78 According to Citibank, any approach which relied on state or
foreign law would allow states and foreign sovereigns to adopt rules which
were harmful to federal interests, would not provide the uniformity which
the field required, and could spawn complex litigation which would be
wasteful and inefficient.79
70. Idat 17.
71. Id at 18-19.
72. 56 Federal Resere Bulletin 140 (1970).
73. Id.
74. Citibank Brief at 18 (cited in note 68).
75. Id at 24. Citibank claimed that imposing liability on it for sovereign risk would create disin-
centives for United States' banks to engage in foreign branching and U.S. foreign commerce, disrupt
the federal regulatory system by creating uncertainty about the application of regulations, give eco-
nomic and political leverage to foreign sovereigns, and provide the benefits of the United States
market without any of its costs. Id at 25-27.
76. Id at 27-32.
77. Id at 37.
78. Id at 35.
79. Id.
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Citibank's final argument concerned the routing instructions on
which the Second Circuit based its collection agreement holding.6 0 It
stressed the district court's finding that the parties did not have a collec-
tion agreement and noted that the Court of Appeals decision would rede-
fine completely the term "payable only abroad."8'
WFAL's brief attacked Citibank's federal arguments and defended
the Second Circuit judgment using the New York case law on which the
district court based its opinion.82 WFAL argued that Congress did not
preempt the local law which governed relationships between banks and
their depositors.83 As proof, it pointed to the fact that banks' "acquisi-
tion and transfer of property, their right to sue and collect their debts,
and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on state law." 84
WFAL argued that Citibank's preemption argument presumed that re-
serve requirements define particular transactions and asserted that the
correct position is that it is necessary to examine the particular transac-
tion to know whether it triggers the reserve requirements. 85
WFAL's brief dealt at great length with the 1970 Federal Reserve
regulation.8 6 WFAL began by noting that the regulation disappeared
from the books in 1980 and did not reappear until 1987.87 Thus the
regulation was not on the books in 1983 when the parties entered into
their transaction. The WFAL brief dismissed the regulation as nothing
more than a recognition by the Federal Reserve that the status of reserves
is to be determined by examining the agreement between the parties and
by applying local law.88 WFAL interpreted the statement in the regula-
tion which appeared to assign sovereign risk to the depositor as an ac-
knowledgement that local law may allow this type of assignment.8 9
WFAL concluded its brief by urging the Supreme Court to reject the
temptation to enact federal common law. "Banking is not a field of
80. Id at 37.
81. Id at 39-40.
82. WFAL asserted that New York case law had fashioned a rule for sovereign risk. Brief for
Respondent Wells Fargo Asia Ltd ("WFAL Brief") at 18, Citibank NA v Wells Fargo Asia LW4 - US
-, 110 S Ct 2034 (1990). The rule, announced in Sokoloff v National City Bank, states that a bank
deposit is not a bailment and a depositor may look to a bank and all of its assets for payment at
maturity. Id, citing Sokoloffv National City Bank, 239 NY 158, 145 NE 917 (1924). The Sokoloff rule,
according to WFAL, "is the norm when bank assets (rather than debts to depositors) are 'taken or
frozen.'" WFAL Brief at 20.
83. Id at 30.
84. Id at 31, quoting First National Bank of Louisville v Kentucky, 76 US 353, 362 (1869).
85. Id at 33.
86. See 56 Federal Reserve Bulletin 140 (cited in note 72), and text accompanying notes 71-73 for
Citibank's position on the regulation.
87. Id at 37.
88. Id at 38.
89. Id.
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'unique' federal interest. The United States has promoted a dual system
of local and federal regulation, rather than uniform national rules." 90 If
changes are needed, "Congress is far better equipped to debate the rela-
tive merits of the points that Citibank raises." 91
In its reply brief, Citibank challenged two of WFAL's basic assump-
tions. The first assumption WFAL made was that it had contracted with
Citibank. 92 Citibank argued that the deposits were made with Citibank/
Manila and that Citibank was not obligated to use its worldwide assets to
pay the deposits. 93
WFAL also assumed that Citibank and its Manila branch were a sin-
gle entity under New York law in actions involving bank assets.9 4 Citi-
bank claimed that it and Citibank/Manila were separate entities under
New York law and that it was not liable when a foreign sovereign pre-
vented the branch from repaying the deposits.95
2. The Decision. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Ap-
peals' judgment on grounds other than those advocated by the parties. It
found that "the factual premise on which the Second Circuit relied in
deciding the case contradicts the factual determinations made by the Dis-
trict Court, determinations that are not clearly erroneous." 96
The Court stated that two principal theories governed the question
of collection. 97 The first theory is that the parties entered into an agree-
ment to permit collection in New York or any place that Citibank had
assets. 98 From the facts of the case, it could be inferred that such an
agreement was within the parties' contemplation.99 The Court concluded
that the Court of Appeals relied on this theory in reaching its decision. 10
The Supreme Court expressly ruled out any judgment based on the
first theory. It held that the district court's finding that there was not a
90. Id at 43.
91. Id at 47.
92. Id at 2.
93. Reply Brief for Petitioner Citibank, NA ("Citibank Reply Brief") at 3-6, Citibank, NA v
Wells Fargo Asia Ltd, - US -, 110 S Ct 2034 (1990).
94. WFAL Brief at 22-23 (cited in note 82).
95. Citibank Reply Brief at 6-9 (cited in note 93).




100. Id at 2040. In its decision, the Court of Appeals viewed collection and repayment as "inter-
changeable concepts" despite its conclusion that the district court's finding that the two concepts
were separate was not clearly erroneous. The district court made a finding that the agreement be-
tween the parties covered repayment only, not collection. However, the Second Circuit panel based
its decision on an agreement for collection. Id.
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collection agreement was not clearly erroneous.101 It also held that an
agreement could not be inferred from a relevant custom or practice in the
international banking community.102
Under the second theory, collection would be permitted if there was
"a duty to pay in New York in any event, a duty that the law created
when the parties have not contracted otherwise."'10 3 The Supreme Court
did not address this theory because it could not determine "from the
opinion of the Court of Appeals which law it found to be controlling."10 4
In addition to New York law, the Second Circuit opinion had referred to
general banking principles and United States law. 105
As a result, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Second
Circuit "to determine which law applies, and the content of that law.' 0 6
The Court stated that the Second Circuit panel could apply New York
law, Philippine law, federal common law, or rely on the preemptive effects
of federal statutes and regulations.' 0 7
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPTIONS
A. New York Law
1. The Single Entity Doctrine. Under New York law, whether Ci-
tibank is obligated to use its general assets to repay the deposits made at
Citibank/Manila depends on whether WFAL entered into a deposit
agreement with Citibank or with a separate entity named Citibank/Ma-
nila.'08 The district court judge noted that in this case "the answer is not
entirely clear."' 0 9
As a general principle, "obligations undertaken by a corporation at a
branch are obligations of the corporation as a whole." 1 0 This general
principle will be referred to as the single entity doctrine.
101. Id at 2041.
102. Id.
103. Id at 2039.
104. Id at 2042.
105. Id, citing Wells Fargo V, 852 F2d at 660.
106. Id at 2042.
107. Id. On January 15, 1991, WFAL filed a motion for affirmance with the Second Circuit. As
of the editorial deadline, the court has not ruled on this motion.
108. A year after this case commenced, New York amended its banking law to create a sovereign
risk exception for national banks. NY Banking Law § 138 (McKinney, 1990). Under this standard,
Citibank would not have been held liable for Citibank/Manila's failure to repay WFAL's deposit.
See text accompanying notes 171-72.
109. Wells Fargo IV, 695 F Supp at 1454.
110. Patrick Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign Branches, 11 L &
Policy Intl Bus 903, 924 (1979).
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In New York law, Sokoloff v. National City Bank applied the single
entity doctrine to foreign branch banking. Sokoloff summarized the status
of a foreign branch of a U.S. bank as follows:
[w~hen considered with relation to the parent bank, [foreign branches]
are not independent agencies; they are, what their name imports,
merely branches, and are subject to the supervision and control of the
parent bank, and are instrumentalities whereby the parent bank carries
on its business, and are established for its own particular purposes, and
their business conduct and policies are controlled by the parent bank,
and their property and assets belong to the parent bank, although nom-
inally held in the names of the particular branches.... Ultimate liabil-
ity for a debt of a branch would rest upon the parent bank.11'
As previously stated, WFAL cited Sokoloff as the authority for its rule
that a depositor may look to a bank and all of its assets for repayment at
maturity when its assets are taken or frozen.112 The New York Court of
Appeals has cited Sokoloff for the proposition that "the parent bank is
ultimately liable for the obligations of the branch."" 3 However, the
United States in its brief as amicus curiae supporting Citibank challenged
WFAL's interpretation of Sokoloff. 114 The government pointed out that
Sokoloff dealt with the acts of a government which the United States did
not recognize. 1 5 Traditionally, the acts of an unrecognized government
have been treated differently than a recognized government's actions. 1 6
The United States also argued that Sokoloff "provides a remedy only
for depositors who place funds with a United States bank for deposit in a
foreign branch."" 7 The United States' final point was that "even if
WFAL were a domestic depositor, it still would qualify for relief under
Sokoloff only if Citibank had wrongfully refused to repay the deposit."' "18
Although Sokoloff is an excellent example of the single entity doc-
trine, it does not create a broad rule which places liability on Citibank.
Citibank could be liable for a wrongful refusal to repay the deposits if it
111. Sokoloff v National City Bank, 130 Misc 66, 73, 224 NYS 102, 114 (S Ct 1927)'(citation
omitted), aff'd mem 223 AD 754, 227 NYS 907, aff'd 250 NY 69, 164 NE 745 (1928) ("Sokoloff".
112. See note 82.
113. Perez v Chase Manhattan Bank, NA, 61 NY2d 460, 468, 474 NYS2d 689, 691, 463 NE2d 56,
57 (Ct App 1984), cert denied 469 US 966 (1984).
114. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner ("US Brief") at 25-27,
Citibank NA v Wells Fargo Asia d, - US -, 110 S Ct 2034 (1990).
115. Id at 25.
116. See Heininger, 11 L & Policy Intl Bus 903 (cited in note 110) for a general discussion of the
actions of an unrecognized government.
117. US Brief at 26 (cited in note 114). The official referee in Sokoloff stated "we are not con-
cerned with questions of liability for transactions originating in Russia and wholly to be performed in
Russia, but with a debt incurred in this State which the defendant agreed to pay on demand at its
own branch in Petrograd." Sokoloff, 130 Misc at 73-74, 224 NYS at 114-15; US Brief at 26 note 20
(cited in note 114).
118. US Brief at 26 (cited in note 114).
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has a duty under New York law to repay the deposits out of its worldwide
assets. Such a duty would arise only if Citibank were a party to the de-
posit contract and promised to repay the time deposits in Manila. If Citi-
bank and Citibank/Manila are a single entity, Citibank would have the
duty to repay the deposits in Manila if Citibank/Manila could not pay
using its own assets.
Sokoloff does not produce this result. The Sokoloff decisions do not
rest on the principle that a home office and its foreign branches are a
single entity. As the United States' brief pointed out, Sokoloff entered
into a contract with the home office of National City Bank, not a foreign
branch.1 19 Sokoloff did not hold that a bank and its branches are a single
entity for all purposes. It held merely that "the home office of a bank is
liable for deposits placed in foreign branches upon the wrongful failure of
the foreign branch to return the deposit on demand."'120 The referee in
Sokoloff freely admitted that New York law treats branches in many re-
spects as "separate corporate entities and as distinct from one another as
any other bank."12'
2. 'The Separate Entity Doctrine. The separate entity doctrine is a
banking law principle which traces its history in New York law to a 1919
opinion which held that a bank which accepts a deposit at a branch is not
liable to return the deposit or honor the check at another branch because
the branch is a separate and distinct entity.'2 ' The rationale for the sepa-
rate entity doctrine is that a contrary rule would force banks to keep a
separate set of records at each office and impose on them the burden of
checking with each office before a deposit was paid or a check was
cashed. 123 New York courts have considered the results of such a con-
trary rule "crippling"' 124 and "intolerable."' 125
The current status of the separate entity doctrine is unclear. In Digi-
trex, Inc. v. Johnson, a federal district court judge, Whitman Knapp, held
that the doctrine was no longer valid under New York law.' 26 The court
based its decision on the fact that the operations of most New York banks
are computerized. 2 7 As a result, the administrative burden rationale for
119. Id at 25.
120. Heininger, 11 L & Policy Intl Bus at 927 (cited in note 110).
121. Sokoloff, 130 Misc at 73, 224 NYS at 114.
122. ChTzanowska v Corn Exch Bank, 173 AD 285, 159 NYS 385 (1916), aff'd per curiam, 225 NY
728, 112 NE 877 (1919).
123. Heininger, 11 L & Policy Intl Bus at 931-32 (cited in note 110).
124. Newtown Jackson Co v Animashaun, 148 NYS2d 66, 68 (S Ct 1955).
125. Cronan v SchiUing, 100 NYS2d 474, 476 (S Ct 1950).
126. Ditre.x, Inc v Johnson, 491 F Supp 66, 68 (SDNY 1980).
127. Id.
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the rule was "no longer persuasive."1 28 Judge Knapp is the same judge
who presided over Wells Fargo.
New York courts appear to have adopted the Digitrex rationale. In
Gavilanes v. Matavosian, the court applied the Digitrex rationale on finding
that the plaintiffs had supplied all the information that was needed to
locate an account. 129 New York courts have placed some limits on Digi-
trex, however. One court ruled that Digitrex does not apply if a bank does
not have high speed computers. 130 Another court accepted the Digitrex
rule, but applied the separate entity doctrine after it found that a bank
was given insufficient information and did not have easy access to branch
records. 131
The Second Circuit rejected the separate entity doctrine for national
banks in First National Bank of Boston International v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba. 132 The Court of Appeals held that "federal law regards a national
bank and its branches as a single entity."1 33 The court based its decision
on the fact that foreign branches cannot lawfully be organized as separate
corporations under the Federal Foreign Banking Law. 134 The author of
this opinion, Judge Kearse, also wrote the Second Circuit opinion in Wells
Fargo.
A recent note on Wells Fargo has implied that the separate entity
doctrine is not dead. 35 The note stated that "the core precept of the
doctrine-that the situs of the debt is at the branch where the deposit is
carried-was not abandoned."' 36 This "situs rule" has been closely tied
to the separate entity doctrine. 137 Both the district court and the Second
Circuit panel in Wells Fargo referred to the situs rule in an approving
manner. 38 Since the judges who wrote these opinions also wrote the
opinions which supposedly dismantled the separate entity doctrine, the
status of the doctrine appears to be unsettled.
The use of the situs rule does not necessarily serve to resuscitate the
separate entity doctrine. Neither of the lower courts specifically dealt
128. Id.
129. Gavilanes v Matavosian, 123 Misc 2d 868, 872-73, 475 NYS2d 987, 990-91 (Civ Ct 1984).
130. Therm.X.Chemical & Oil Corp v Extebank, 84 AD2d 787, 787, 444 NYS2d 26, 27 (1981).
131. State Tax Conm'n v Blanchard Management Corp, 91 AD2d 501, 502, 456 NYS2d 364, 366
(1982).
132. First National Bank of Boston International v Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F2d 895, 900 (2d Cir
1981), cert denied, 459 US 1091 (1982).
133. Id.
134. Id, citing Federal Foreign Banking Law, 12 USC SS 601, 603 (1976).
135. See Note, A Safety Net for the Eurodollar Market: Wells Fargo Asia Ltd v Citibank, 65 NYU L
Rev 126, 140-41 (1990).
136. Id at 140.
137. See id at 140-41.
138. Wells Fargo V, 852 F2d at 660; Wells Fargo II, 660 F Supp at 947.
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with the doctrine. Given the Supreme Court's inability to determine
what law the Second Circuit panel used, 139 it is difficult to link the men-
tion of the situs rule to New York's separate entity doctrine. 140
The district court and the Second Circuit panel may not have recog-
nized the close relationship between the separate entity doctrine and the
situs rule. The situs rule by itself has not played a major role in Wells
Fargo. The district court assumed that the deposit would be paid in Ma-
nila and this assumption was not disputed in the later installments of the
case.141
Since New York courts have adopted the Digitrex rationale, Citibank
and Citibank/Manila are a single entity under New York law. The fact
that the district court and the Second Circuit panel referred to the situs
rule is not enough to resurrect the separate entity rule. As a result, Citi-
bank's worldwide assets should be available to pay the deposit in Manila
under New York law.
B. Philippine Law
Although a detailed discussion of Philippine law is beyond the scope
of this case comment, the question under Philippine law, as in New York
law, is whether Citibank and Citibank/Manila are a single entity. In his
original opinion, the district court judge held that under Philippine law,
"branches of banks are not separate legal entities apart from the bank as
an institution."'142 If the Second Circuit panel applies Philippine law, it
will have to determine whether this holding is clearly erroneous.
C. Federal Law
1. Reserve Requirements. Citibank's position on the role of federal
law in Wells Fargo is as follows:
If state or foreign law were construed to require the home office of a
U.S. bank to repay deposits in its foreign branch that the foreign gov-
ernment prevents the branch from repaying, it would run afoul of fed-
eral banking statutes and policies and therefore would be displaced
either as a matter of federal preemption or by application of uniform
federal common law. Under either theory, the allocation of sovereign
139. Wells Fargo VI, - US -, 110 S Ct at 2042; See text accompanying notes 104-7.
140. The situs rule does apply in a variety of situations. For example, the situs rule plays a role in
whether the act of state doctrine applies to a banking case. Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving
Debt Situs Confusion, 86 Colum L Rev 594 (1986). Neither the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court
disturbed the trial court's rejection of Citibank's act of state defense. (See text accompanying notes
45-47).
141. Wells Fargo I, 660 F Supp at 950.
142. Id at 948 (district court judge quoting plaintiff's expert witness).
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risk set forth by Congress and the Federal Reserve Board and incorpo-
rated into the fabric of the Nation's banking system must prevail. 143
Citibank also argued that "federal law provides only a specific and nar-
rowly-focused rule governing foreign sovereign risk that is necessary to
further clearly established federal policies and interests." 144
Citibank argued in its brief that the regulations governing reserve
requirements and deposit insurance placed the burden of sovereign risk
on WFAL.145 Citibank based a substantial portion of its reserve require-
ment argument on a 1970 Federal Reserve regulation. 146 The regulation
limited the exemption from reserve requirements "to deposits in foreign
branches as to which the depositor is entitled, under his agreement with
the bank, to demand payment only outside of the United States, regard-
less of special circumstances." 147 The regulation also provides that "[a]
customer who makes a deposit that is payable solely at a foreign branch
assumes whatever risk may exist that the foreign country might impose
restrictions on withdrawals." 148 Citibank argued that the regulation was
part of a federal rule which allocates sovereign risk to the depositor. 149
Citibank's reserve requirement argument raises two questions which
it does not answer adequately. First, is MAAB 47 a restriction on with-
drawals? The decree can be interpreted as a freeze on certain assets rather
than a restriction on withdrawals. WFAL did not receive its funds be-
cause Citibank/Manila could not use its assets and Citibank refused to
use its worldwide assets. The decree did not affect WFAL's ability to
withdraw or its deposit rights. It only restricted the use of certain assets
which could be used to repay the deposits. A telex from the Philippine
authorities which disavowed any objection to the use of Citibank's world-
wide assets to discharge the deposits supports this interpretation of
MAAB 47.150 The district court concluded that MAAB 47 did not pre-
vent the transfer of assets from outside the Philippines to Manila in order
143. Citibank Brief at 21-22 (cited in note 68).
144. Citibank Reply Brief at 11, note 9 (cited in note 93).
145. See text accompanying notes 68-74.
146. See notes.71-73.
147. 56 Federal Reserve Bulletin 140 at 140 (cited in note 72).
148. Id.
149. Citibank Brief at 18-21 (cited in note 68).
150. The telex, which was dated December 14, 1984, stated:
If there is a judgment by a court or an extrajudicial settlement to the effect that a foreign
curency [sic] deposit placed with a foreign currency deposit unit ('FCDU') of the Philippine,
branch of a foreign bank is recoverable from a non Philippine office of such foreign bank
and if such liability is satisfied from assets held outside the Philippines and does not result,
directly or indirectly, in a net outflow of foreign currency from the Philippines the Central
Bank of the Philippines is of the view that the satisfaction of payment of such deposit
liability on these terms would not be inconsistent with [the memorandum].
Wells Fargo II, 660 F Supp at 949-50.
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to repay the deposits.15' Since the decree focused on Citibank's assets
rather than WFAL's deposits, MAAB 47 is not a restriction on withdraw-
als. Thus, WFAL does not bear the burden of the Philippine govern-
ment's actions under the 1970 Federal Reserve regulation.
Second, assuming that the deposits can be repaid only in Manila us-
ing outside assets, would repayment of the deposits offend any other fed-
eral regulations or statutes? Federal regulations and statutes which deal
with reserve requirements, deposit insurance, and interest rates exempt
any deposit which is payable only at an office which is located outside of
the United States. 152 The deposit of a foreign branch of a domestic cor-
poration is not regarded as the "deposit of a United States resident if the
funds serve a purpose in connection with its foreign or international
business." 5 3
If WFAL's deposits can only be repaid in Manila, then they do not
disturb Citibank's exemptions from reserve requirements, deposit insur-
ance, or interest rate restrictions. The federal regulations focus on the
deposits, not the assets which may be used to repay them. A decision
requiring Citibank to use its worldwide assets to repay WFAL's deposits
in Manila would not violate the requirement that the deposits be payable
only outside the United States. As long as the deposits can only be paid
outside the United States, Citibank's deposit exemptions are safe.
2. Federal Law and the Single Entity Doctrine. Federal law does not
address the question of which assets a bank must use to repay deposits
booked at foreign branches. However, as previously stated, the Second
Circuit has held that a national bank and its branches are a single entity
under federal law.154
According to the Federal Reserve, "It is true that there is no separate
corporate entity as between the parent bank and its branch. A deposit
liability of a branch is, therefore, a liability of the parent bank. .. 155
Another Federal Reserve opinion concluded:
There is nothing ... to indicate that branches established in foreign
countries are to have a separate existence and constitute separate cor-
porations. On the contrary, it is clear that the parent bank is merely to
engage in certain foreign transactions through its foreign branch. 156
151. Id at 950.
152. 12 USC § 461(b)(6)(D) (1988); 12 USC § 1813(5)(A) (1988); 12 CFR S 217.1(c)(2) (1990).
153. 12 CFR S 204.2(t) note 12 (1990). The term "any deposit that is payable only at an office
located outside the United States" has been defined as a "deposit of a person who is not a United
States resident as to which the depositor is entitled, under the agreement with the institution, to
demand payment only outside the United States." 12 CFR S 204.2(t) (1990).
154. See text accompanying notes 132-34.
155. 4 Federal Reserve Bulletin 1123 (1918).
156. 3 Federal Reserve Bulletin 198, 199 (1917).
Vol. 1991:241
258 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 1991:241
If Citibank and Citibank/Manila are a single entity under federal
law, then it should not matter which assets are used to repay WFAL's
deposits. As one article noted:
Whether... Citibank as a whole would be hurt depends on whether
one consolidates Citibank's accounts world-wide for this purpose, in
which case there is no net damage, or whether the accounts are kept
separately for the separate units, so that Citibank New York would
have paid out against a deposit it had never received. 157
3. Credit and Sovereign Risk. Citibank's position on sovereign risk
reveals a very inconsistent federal policy regarding the assumption of risk
by foreign branches. Throughout the action, Citibank maintained that it
would guarantee Citibank/Manila's deposits against credit risk.158 Both
WFAL and Citibank agreed "that in the event a third person (e.g., a bank
robber) or an act of nature (e.g., flood or fire) disabled the branch bank
from timely repaying deposits made with it, the main office would assume
liability."159
If Citibank guarantees payment in the United States when its foreign
branches are precluded from paying due to credit risk, it is in violation of
the 1970 Federal Reserve regulation on which it based its reserve require-
ment argument.' 60 The regulation states that a deposit is not exempt
from reserve requirements if the depositor can demand payment in the
United States.16 1 This rule applies "regardless of special circum-
stances." 162 If Citibank's willingness to assume liability at its main office
in credit risk cases includes the possibility of repayment in the United
States, its deposits are no longer exempt from reserve requirements ac-
cording to the 1970 regulation.
Citibank's refusal to guarantee deposits against sovereign risk is not
as broad as it appears to be on the surface. In its reply brief, Citibank
states:
This is not to say, of course, that every action that a foreign sovereign
takes with respect to foreign branch operations of a U.S. bank has the
effect of relieving the U.S. bank from responsibility. Foreign govern-
ments can and do take a variety of regulatory actions (such as imposing
taxes or reserve requirements) that do not rise to the level of restricting
withdrawal of deposits from the branch. Whether a sovereign action
will rise to this level in a particular case will necessarily depend upon a
showing of factual restriction on withdrawal.
163
157. Smedresman and Lowenfeld, 64 NYU L Rev at 770 (cited in note 24).
158. Wells Fargo 1, 612 F Supp at 353; Citibank Reply Brief at 5-6 (cited in note 93).
159. Wells Fargo 1, 612 F Supp at 352-53.
160. 56 Federal Reserve Bulletin at 140 (cited in note 72).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Citibank Reply Brief at 8 note 6 (cited in note 93).
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Unfortunately, this is the only explanation Citibank gives for its position
on guarantees and sovereign action. Citibank's reply brief did not ex-
plain why it viewed the Philippine asset freeze as a restriction on
withdrawal.
The Federal Reserve's position on sovereign risk mirrors Citibank's.
In a memorandum supporting Citibank at trial, the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York stated that "as long as foreign-branch deposits remain subject
to some degree of political risk, they do not serve as a substitute for United
States deposits, and the exemption from reserve requirements is consis-
tent with the efficient operation of monetary policy." 164
4. Federal Policy. The federal government does not have a coher-
ent policy on credit and sovereign risk in international banking. The dis-
tinction which Citibank and the Federal Reserve make between sovereign
risk and credit risk does not appear in the Federal Reserve regulations. 165
If the official Federal Reserve policy allows Citibank to assume some sov-
ereign risk, how much and what types of sovereign risk may it assume?
The Federal Reserve and Citibank do not provide any answers to this
question.
Citibank's argument that the federal regulations and policies dealing
with reserve requirements place sovereign risk on WFAL is incorrect.
The Philippine decree does not clash with the Federal Reserve regulations
governing reserve requirements. In addition, repayment of WFAL's de-
posits in Manila would not violate the exemption regulations. 166
The federal regulations and statutes on which Citibank builds its
case do not, as it claims, "plainly establish a rule of federal law providing
that the depositor at the foreign branch rather than the U.S. home office
bears the foreign sovereign risk." 167 The shifting federal record in inter-
national banking does not provide a firm foundation for federal preemp-
tion of the field.
Citibank based its federal common law argument on the grounds
that a "uniform rule of federal law is necessary here in order to effectuate
federal policies and to provide a national standard governing the liability
of U.S. banks to depositors in their foreign branches."' 168 Given the con-
fused state of federal policy, it is difficult to see how it can be effectuated
in an efficient manner.
164. Smedresman and Lowenfeld, 64 NYU L Rev at 792 (cited in note 24) (quoting Memoran-
dum of Law of Federal Reserve Bank of New York as Amicus Curiae at 9, Wells Fargo I, 660 F Supp
947 (SDNY 1987)).
165. Smedresman and Lowenfeld, 64 NYU L Rev at 792 (cited in note 24).
166. See text accompanying notes 152-53.
167. Citibank Reply Brief at 13 (cited in note 93).
168. Citibank Brief at 27 (cited in note 68).
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Despite the disarray in federal banking policy, Citibank's public pol-
icy arguments should not be given short shrift. Certain types of sovereign
risk, such as the nationalization of foreign branches, should not be as-
sumed by a home office and the U.S. banking system. Problems arise
when a foreign sovereign's actions do not rise to the level of restricting
withdrawals or confiscating assets but still trigger the U.S. deposit insur-
ance system. For example, if a hostile foreign power implemented MAAB
47 and a U.S. bank failed when it attempted to pay off depositors at the
foreign branch, the FDIC would bear the loss. Although it is doubtful
that this would occur due to the high cost the foreign sovereign would pay
for its actions (for example, in trade sanctions, frozen assets, and blocked
World Bank loans), it raises disturbing questions about the proper way to
deal with sovereign risk.
Citibank's position is flawed because federal laws and policies do not
deal clearly with the risks involved in international banking. Both Citi-
bank and the Federal Reserve state that a home office may assume liability
for credit risks and certain types of sovereign risk despite regulatory lan-
guage to the contrary. 169 As a result, Citibank's federal preemption argu-
ment fails. 170
The lack of consistent federal banking policy also hampers Citi-
bank's common law argument. Without a strong foundation to build on,
courts would be forced to create banking law from scratch. Given the
courts' track record in Wells Fargo as well as their treatment of the sepa-
rate entity doctrine, courts should not try their hand at judicial legislation
in banking. Congress and the Federal Reserve are better equipped to
weigh the policy arguments which Citibank has raised.
Citibank's claim that states are not equipped to deal with banking is
also questionable. In 1984, one year after the Wells Fargo litigation began,
New York amended its statute protecting banks from sovereign risk to
include national banks.)7' The New York law states that any national
bank which is located in the state and has branches in foreign countries:
shall be liable for contracts to be performed at such branch office or
offices and for deposits to be repaid at such branch office or offices to
no greater extent than a bank, banking corporation or other organiza-
tion or association for banking purposes organized and existing under
the laws of such foreign country would be liable under its laws. 172
169. See text accompanying notes 158-64.
170. Although Citibank repeatedly referred to a federal interest in sovereign risk allocation, it
never explained why neither Congress nor the Federal Reserve has adopted a statute or issued an
interpretation which clearly places sovereign risk on the foreign depositor's shoulders. If sovereign
risk is such a vital federal concern, why have the federal authorities failed to act on the question in
the seven years Wells Fargo has been on stage?
171. NY Banking Law S 138 (McKinney, 1990).
172. Id.
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If a New York national bank's foreign branch had entered into a deposit
contract which was governed by this amended New York law and was
placed in Citibank/Manila's position, the home bank would not have
been held liable.
V. OBSTACLES TO AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
Wells Fargo is not the threat to U.S. banking which Citibank has
made it out to be. The fact situation in this case is highly unusual. When
foreign sovereigns take action which affects ownership rights, they usually
confiscate assets or nationalize deposits. A carefully crafted decision
which requires repayment in Manila would not upset the current federal
banking system.
Wells Fargo remains significant because it exposes a number of pitfalls
for United States foreign branch banking. The first of these is the lack of
a coherent federal policy on international banking. If the Federal Reserve
is going to treat credit risk and sovereign risk differently, then its regula-
tions should reflect that policy. Congress and the Federal Reserve must
define their goals and set clear parameters for U.S. international banking.
If the United States ever had the opportunity to negotiate an interna-
tional standard for sovereign risk with the world's banking powers, it
would be at a serious disadvantage. It would have to establish clear policy
goals for itself before it could even make a proposal.
Another pitfall could have been avoided by the banks themselves.
For the past six years, two of the largest and most sophisticated banks in
the United States have been arguing over which law governs their stan-
dardized loan agreement. If negotiable international deposits can carry a
legend stipulating which law governs them, a non-negotiable deposit con-
tract should be able to contain a choice of law stipulation. 173 Wells Fargo
is a poor precedent from a choice of law standpoint.
The third and final obstacle is the separate entity doctrine. Doc-
trines which are based on early twentieth century technology should .not
govern international banking as it enters the twenty-first century. The
separate entity doctrine only clouds the debate on proper international
banking policy. If foreign branches are treated as separate entities for
certain transactions, it should be for solid financial and legal reasons.
VI. CONCLUSION
Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. has placed the executive, legis-
lative, and judicial branches of the U.S. government at a crossroads. De-
spite Citibank's strenuous arguments to the contrary, the case reveals that
173. Wells Fargo 1, 612 F Supp at 353.
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Congress and the Federal Reserve have failed to fashion a clear and con-
cise federal policy on international banking. If U.S. banks are to compete
globally, they must have a firm regulatory foundation upon which to
build.
Wells Fargo also has forced courts to reevaluate banking case law as
well as the use of choice of law rules. Courts should not be afraid to
throw away antiquated banking principles such as the separate entity doc-
trine. Any rule which outlasts its purpose is an impediment. In addition,
courts must craft specific choice of law rules for international banking
transactions. The judicial system does not have the resources to send in-
ternational banking cases up and down the system in search of the right
law to apply.
The United States must take the necessary steps to remain competi-
tive in international banking. It cannot afford to rely on a patchwork of
inconsistent federal policies and outdated banking case law.
Shawn E. Flatt
